January 18, 2017

Plan B: Managing surgical equipment failure

By: OR Manager
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With safety and quality now tied to reimbursement as part of value-based purchasing (VBP), hospitals must meet benchmarks for patient satisfaction, clinical outcomes, and readmissions to avoid financial penalties imposed by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.

The VBP program added the Patient Safety Indicator, or PSI 90, metric in 2015. The PSI 90 is a composite metric providing information on hospital complications and adverse events related to surgical procedures and childbirth. This metric has led to scrutiny of patient care and greater emphasis on avoiding errors and adverse events.

 

Understanding the problem

Of all medical errors affecting hospital patients, approximately half are attributable to surgical procedures. Much has been published about medication errors, wrong-site surgery and wrong surgery, retained foreign objects, and communication and handoff errors. Literature on the incidence of equipment failure errors is less common.

Understanding the types of equipment failure and the role of technology is important to manage risk. As the use of advanced technology increases, so does the complexity of the surgical procedures, which, in turn, increases the risk of errors caused by equipment failure.

Surgical technology is expensive. Intraoperative magnetic resonance imaging and CT scanning equipment, construction and integration of equipment and imaging technology for hybrid ORs, and robotic surgery equipment cost millions of dollars. Most facilities cannot duplicate high-end technology, so OR leaders need to plan proactively for equipment failure.

Equipment failures occur because of availability issues, configuration or setup errors, or direct malfunction. A problem identified as equipment failure, however, does not always lead to downtime or case cancellation because there may still be some functioning equipment.

For example, hybrid ORs are used for various procedures, some requiring advanced imaging and others no imaging at all. Thus, a hybrid OR equipment malfunction can be managed in various ways.

 

Hybrid OR case study

At our institution, a malfunction occurred in the hybrid OR during a diagnostic vascular case. Toward the end of the case, an error with the imaging system led to equipment shutdown. The patient was not under general anesthesia. The radiology technologist consulted with his peers and notified biomedical engineering, but troubleshooting did not solve the problem.

The technologist then called the equipment manufacturer, and the surgeon asked to have a portable C-arm brought into the room to complete the case. The manufacturer and the technologist discussed troubleshooting protocols via phone without success, so a service engineer was sent.

Upon case completion, the room was turned over to the manufacturer’s engineer for repair, and the remaining cases were canceled.

When reviewing the situation, the vascular surgeon said a portable C-arm would not always be a suitable alternative for a hybrid OR imaging malfunction.

More complex cases require high-resolution images and advanced processing techniques not available on portable systems. Also, portable systems cannot adequately image large and obese patients.

Such limitations could result in a less than optimal clinical outcome. Thus, the surgeon evaluates whether the alternative use of a C-arm is appropriate on a case-by-case basis.

Other considerations for portable systems include higher radiation doses to the patient and staff, C-arm shutdowns because of overheating, and potentially longer case times.

Opinions were sought from other surgeons who use the hybrid OR. They said the course of action depends on when failure occurs (ie, before the patient is in the room, during prep, intraoperatively, or postprocedure).

Responses included using a portable C-arm, transferring the patient to the cath lab where another fixed angiography system is available, modifying or aborting the procedure, or delaying or cancelling the case.

After discussion, it became evident “one size does not fit all.” The appropriate response for an equipment malfunction depends on the surgeon, procedure, patient acuity, timing of the failure, the nature of the malfunction, and proposed resolution.

Team members including the surgeons, anesthesiologists, nurses, radiologists, and cath lab staff need to confer on the decisions, and they may need to consider variables such as OR availability, staffing resources, and ICU census.

 

Analysis and action

There are proactive and reactive ways to manage equipment failure. Ideally, in scenarios with greater risk and no backup, an analysis should be done examining “What if?”

One method is the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), which examines the process steps and asks:

• What could go wrong?

• Why would a failure happen?

• What is the consequence of each failure?

FMEA was adapted by the Department of Veteran’s Affairs National Center for Patient Safety into the Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis, HFMEA. This model helps teams conduct a proactive risk assessment to evaluate a new process before it is implemented, or assess the effect of a change to an existing process.

The steps of a HFMEA are as follows:

• identify the problem

• assemble the team

• graphically describe the process

• conduct the analysis

• identify actions and outcome measures.

 

Assemble the team

Once the problem was defined, we formed a team that included an anesthesiologist, vascular surgeon, cardiac surgeon, cardiologist, OR RN and surgical technologist, cath lab RN and cardiac technologist, perfusionist, radiology technologist, and executives from the perioperative, heart and vascular, and radiology service lines.

Because the OR and cath lab schedules left all rooms fully booked electively until late in the day, we knew communication would be critical between the two departments at the first sign of an equipment malfunction.

First, we mapped out the current process for triaging the error. Then we analyzed the appropriate responses according to when the error occurred, identifying communication pathways and action plans.

The decision-making process for identifying and resolving an equipment malfunction is shown in the sidebar.

ORM0217-18_sidebar

Launch the HFMEA

In a HFMEA, the probability and severity of each error is analyzed, and a risk score is calculated. Errors with higher risk scores should be examined first because they have the most impact.

Given that the error was known (ie, hybrid OR imaging failure), we reviewed all hybrid OR procedures to see which one would be most affected by malfunctioning imaging equipment. Transcatheter aortic valve replacement (TAVR) was selected for review because of the complexity of the procedure, number of staff and physicians involved, and patient acuity.

The team mapped out a high-level procedural flow with these steps: patient arrival in the OR, anesthesia prep, vascular access, valvuloplasty, valve deployment, and case finish. A spreadsheet diagrammed the high-level tasks of each team member at each phase. In the last column, the team noted the best course of action for each phase of the case when equipment failure might occur.

The cardiologists and surgeons said that the precision needed to deploy the valve in the correct anatomical location requires fixed angiography. A portable C-arm is not an acceptable alternative given its limitations, the technicality of the procedure, and patient acuity. Thus, if the equipment failed before the case began (ie, during the routine quality control check), the case would be on hold until the status of the repair was determined.

If the patient was in the room and under anesthesia, but the incision was not yet made, any equipment malfunction would put the case on hold. In this case, the patient might need to be moved to the postanesthesia care unit so that engineering could assess the equipment.

If the equipment could not be repaired or the engineer was delayed, the case would be canceled and the patient reversed.

The time threshold is decided by the surgeon and anesthesiologist because the longer the patient is under anesthesia, the greater the risk for complications.

If failure occurred intraoperatively, the surgeons and cardiologists agreed that a C-arm was not an acceptable alternative to continue the case. A portable C-arm could be used to remove the catheters and abort the case, but it could not provide the image quality for valvuloplasty and valve deployment without added risk to the patient.

Without another hybrid OR, the only locations with fixed angiography would be in interventional radiology or cardiology.

The cardiac catheterization lab (CCL) was selected because hemodynamic monitoring and transesophageal echo were available in addition to the angiography system.

CCL staff were already assisting with these cases, and the anesthesiologists were familiar with the equipment in this area. The CCL was on the same floor as the OR, so the patient did not need to be moved via elevator.

Perfusion checked the gas, electrical outlets, and suction in case a heart-lung machine and ancillary equipment were needed. All connections and equipment setup were tested in advance to ensure patient safety. Three labs were large enough and had the necessary connections to finish a TAVR.

If the imaging equipment could not be repaired in a timely fashion, the elective TAVR procedure would be suspended.

The “identifiable action” of the team was to safely and efficiently transport the patient from one care setting to another and complete the case. Patient transport between departments requires additional resources, coordination, and communication.

Because these cases are elective and performed during regular operating hours, additional staff are available to move supplies and instrumentation in a case cart available outside the hybrid OR. Perfusion uses mobile storage carts for supplies that could be wheeled in from the OR, and anesthesiology has a preexisting setup in the CCL.

TAVR cases have two circulators, one from the CCL and one from the OR, who handle coordination and logistics of transfer in conjunction with the CCL control desk.

Because both CCL and OR staff perform these cases, the remaining and key component is the communication process for transfer. At this point in the case, time is of the essence, and gaps in communication can cause delays, serious breakdowns in the continuity of care, inappropriate treatment, and potential harm to the patient.

The team developed communication pathways and set up processes, roles, and responsibilities for each team member in the OR and the CCL. A mock procedure was performed after hours to review the process, identify gaps, and provide clarity on roles and responsibilities.

 

Lower risks, higher ROI

Increasingly intricate and advanced equipment and technology are being used in the perioperative suite. Hospital leadership and regulatory committees must assist with the development and enforcement of policies and procedures related to education, but also address how to manage a technology malfunction.

Patient safety is the most important consideration. Equipment failure will affect patient outcomes, the provision of certain types of care, safety event reporting, and potential value-based care penalties.

A proactive approach involving clinical staff, physicians, and administration to handle unplanned downtime helps mitigate risks and yields a better return on investment in the technology. ✥

 

Hilary Nierenberg, MPH, MS, ANP-C

Hilary Nierenberg, MPH, MS, ANP-C, is the administrator of the Heart and Vascular Hospital, Hackensack UMC, part of the Hackensack Meridian Network, Hackensack, New Jersey. She is responsible for cardiovascular operations, strategic planning, and management for noninvasive and invasive treatment areas. She received BS and MS degrees from Columbia University School of Nursing and her MPH at Columbia University School of Public Health in the Executive Program.

 

Jennifer Schaadt

Jennifer Schaadt, a surgery business development manager with Siemens Healthcare, Erlangen, Germany, provides clinical, operational, and financial operational assistance within the perioperative space as it relates to various imaging modalities. She is a certified project manager, has a certificate in Lean methods, and is a Six Sigma Green Belt. She received an MS in perfusion sciences and an executive MBA from Northeastern University.

 

Terri Freguletti, MAS, RN, CNOR

Terri Freguletti, MAS, RN, CNOR, is vice president, perioperative services and capacity management at Hackensack UMC, part of the Hackensack Meridian Network, Hackensack, New Jersey. She graduated from St Peter’s University summa cum laude with a bachelor’s degree in healthcare management and has a master’s degree in administrative science from Fairleigh Dickinson University.

References

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Lyons V E, Wing T. Getting ready for emerging perioperative technologies. AORN 2016;102:647-652. http://www.aornjournal.org/article/S0001-2092(15)00806-6/abstract.

The Facility Guidelines Institute. Guidelines for design and construction of hospitals and outpatient facilities. 2014. Chicago, IL: American Society of Healthcare Engineering.

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