I have spent over a decade turning around underperforming organizations. Different industries, different leadership cultures, different balance sheets.
The presenting problem is always different, but the root cause lands in the same place more than 80 percent of the time: people. Specifically, the absence of any real infrastructure to develop them past the point where they became useful enough to leave alone.
Two years ago, that work brought me into health care—specifically into the sterile processing departments (SPDs) that sit directly underneath the surgical programs for which perioperative leaders are responsible. What I found there was not a unique problem. It was the same people problem I had been solving in other industries for a long time.
The difference is that, in SPD, the consequences do not show up on a quarterly report first. They show up in your operating rooms. And often nobody connects them back to where they actually started.
I want to be clear about what I mean when I say this is a people problem. I am not pointing at individual technicians who are trying and falling short. I am talking about the entire operator layer. Every tech, every lead, every supervisor, and every manager: the full workforce of the most consequential department in the hospital that most senior leaders have never seriously examined.
The industry response to SPD failures over the past two decades has been to invest in tracking technology—instrument management systems, barcoding, RFID, tray-level documentation, real-time dashboards. The platforms are sophisticated. The spending has been real. The fundamental problems have not moved.
Surgical delays caused by incomplete or missing trays continue to cost hospitals between six and nine million dollars annually in lost OR revenue. Joint Commission citations tied to sterile processing remain among the most common findings in hospital surveys. Walk into a struggling SPD today and the errors look the same as they did 15 years ago, regardless of what software is running in the background.
Here is what the technology actually did. It documented the output of an underdeveloped workforce and gave leadership a dashboard to look at instead of the operators producing the numbers. The tracking system worked exactly as designed. It recorded what the operator entered. When the operator did not know what “complete” looked like, the system had no mechanism to catch that. It just moved the record forward.
To be fair to hospital leadership, the response to SPD performance problems has not been limited to technology. Most surgical programs have also spent real money on in-services, one-off training events, vendor-led education sessions, and periodic competency refreshers.
The intention behind that spending was right. The structural problem with that category of intervention is what failed.
Research on how people retain newly learned information shows that without reinforcement, individuals forget up to 90 percent of what they learned within a single week. Within 24 hours of a training session, up to 70 percent of key concepts can already be gone.
That is not unique to health care. That is how human memory works without a system designed to continuously reinforce what was taught.
A one-day in-service in a department running 15 to 20 percent annual turnover does not build organizational competency. It creates a temporary knowledge event in a portion of the workforce that starts degrading before the trainer reaches the parking lot. Three months later some of the people who attended have moved on. The replacements were not in the room. The department is now operating on a standard that was never uniformly established in the first place.
The research on this is also specific about timing. Training knowledge decay happens fastest when there is a lag between instruction and real application. The pattern that shows up consistently is performance that looks adequate at the end of week one and shows clear gaps by week four. One-off training cannot fix a system that was never built. It gives the appearance of action while the underlying problem keeps running.
There is a response that comes up reliably when this conversation reaches department leadership. “We already do competency.” “We have sign-off sheets.” “Staff demonstrate the skill and we document it.”
That is not competency verification. That is a witnessed event. A signature on a form documents that a person performed a task correctly one time in front of someone who was looking. It says nothing about whether they did it correctly the next day when nobody was watching. It does not tell you whether the habit held through the second week, or the second month, or after three new hires joined and the informal department standard quietly shifted.
Changing an established behavior pattern in an adult takes consistent reinforcement over weeks and months. A single observed demonstration followed by a filed form does not get you there.
Sustained competency requires a system that observes, documents, and verifies performance repeatedly over time against a standard that does not flex based on who happens to be supervising that shift. Checking a box is not the same as building an operator. The industry has been doing one and calling it the other for a long time.
SIPS Healthcare Solutions has spent two decades entering stagnant, underperforming, and leadership-deprived SPDs across the country. Over that time, we developed a 10-indicator diagnostic called the OBI-10, the Operational Blindness Index. It scores a department across 10 dimensions, including whether the metrics actually reflect what is happening, whether the department operates ahead of problems or chases them, whether leadership can explain root cause to executives when asked, and whether any mechanism exists to see a problem developing before the OR feels it.
We have administered the OBI-10 to 189 healthcare leaders across facilities of every size and type, and 99.5 percent scored either At Risk or Operationally Blind.
That is not a rounding error. That is a structural finding. Most SPD leadership teams operating hospitals across this country right now cannot tell you with documented confidence what is actually happening in their departments on any given shift.
They know something is wrong. They have known for a while. They just cannot locate exactly where it starts or explain clearly why it keeps coming back after each fix.
When we dig into what sits underneath those scores, the same pattern surfaces. Metrics that look acceptable until the OR says otherwise. Consultants who came through and left without lasting change. Accountability that goes unclear the moment something fails. Standard operating procedures that exist on paper and vary in execution depending on the day, the shift, and whoever showed up.
That variability is not a scheduling problem or a staffing ratio problem. It is what a workforce looks like when it was never developed to a consistent standard.
The sterile processing workforce in the United States consists of approximately 114,000 people. Annual turnover at stable facilities runs between 15 and 20 percent. At facilities relying on contract labor, the attrition climbs to 20 to 30 percent. The average SPD is replacing a meaningful portion of its entire team every single year, on a continuous cycle, with no accounting for what that does to the competency floor of the department over time.
Research on workforce development is consistent on the timeline. It takes six to 12 months for a new employee in a technically complex role to reach functional productivity. Not orientation completion. Not a passing test score. Actual capability where the person can execute without supervision and catch their own errors before those errors become someone else’s problem.
The average SPD technician leaves their position within one to two years. Run that math and the picture becomes clear fast. Most of the active SPD workforce at any given facility on any given day is operating below the productivity threshold the job requires. It’s not because of attitude or effort. It’s because the industry model structurally prevents them from ever staying long enough to get past it.
The field treats certification as proof of competency. That framing is worth examining more carefully than it usually gets.
The two primary credentialing bodies in sterile processing are the Healthcare Sterile Processing Association (HSPA, formerly IAHCSMM) and the Certification Board for Sterile Processing and Distribution (CBSPD). HSPA has crossed 30,000-plus total certificants across all its credentials combined. CBSPD has credentialed 31,000-plus personnel internationally since its founding, with currently more than 20,000 active certificants.
Add both numbers together and the total active credentialed population across both organizations sits at roughly 50,000 people.
(A note on these numbers. Both credentialing bodies report active certificants but neither publishes a breakdown of where those individuals are today. The figures include people currently working as technicians on a department floor, people who moved into leadership or consulting, people who left the field entirely, and people who simply keep their certification current out of professional habit. That ambiguity is not a minor footnote. It is part of the same problem this article is documenting.)
Out of a workforce of 114,000, that means roughly 56 percent of the people actively employed in sterile processing right now do not hold even a foundational entry-level credential from either organization.
The more telling number is what happens past that first certification.
The Certified Registered Central Service Technician (CRCST) from HSPA and the Certified Sterile Processing and Distribution Technician (CSPDT) from CBSPD are both entry-level credentials. Both organizations are explicit about this in their own documentation. These exams assess baseline competency for someone starting out in sterile processing. They were never intended to be the endpoint of professional development. The intent was always that they mark the beginning.
The advanced credential that actually tests whether someone can identify, inspect, and handle complex surgical instrumentation at a functional level is HSPA’s Certified Instrument Specialist (CIS). To sit for that exam, a candidate needs an active CRCST plus 200 documented hours of instrument-specific work experience. In 2024, 854 people across the entire country sat for it, out of 114,000 employed in the field. That’s less than one percent.
CBSPD, for its part, discontinued its equivalent instrument specialist certification in November 2021. One of the two major credentialing bodies in this industry decided the market was not using the advanced instrument credential enough to justify continuing to offer it. The credential that most directly tested whether an operator could actually handle the instruments going into patients was so underutilized it could not survive as an active program.
The industry built a credentialing system that measures orientation-level knowledge, labeled it competency, and then looked elsewhere when outcomes kept failing to improve.
Both credentialing bodies require clinical hours before a candidate can sit for certification. On paper, that provides some assurance that the person has worked in a real department. In practice, there is no mechanism to verify the quality of what happened during those hours.
A candidate can log every required hour in a department that is itself dysfunctional, under a lead whose own competency was never measured, working to a standard that shifts by shift and by whoever is in charge that day. They complete the hours, sit for the exam, pass, and receive a credential the industry treats as readiness.
The hours were real. What happened during them was never assessed. That is not an indictment of the credentialing organizations. They cannot control the conditions inside every facility where candidates accumulate their hours. It is simply an honest observation about the gap between what that credential can verify and what people assume it verifies.
Years of experience has become the default hiring filter for SPD advancement—lead techs, supervisors, managers, directors. Across the industry, the criteria is built on time in the field, a basic certification, and a resume showing movement from facility to facility over the years.
A review of 81 independent studies published in Personnel Psychology and reported by Harvard Business Review found the correlation between years of prior work experience and actual job performance is .06. On a scale where 1.0 is a perfect predictor, that number is essentially no predictor at all. The research specifically found that even when candidates had performed the same tasks, held the same titles, and worked in directly relevant settings, it did not translate into better performance at the next organization.
Yet SPD has been building its leadership pipeline on that number for years.
A technician with eight years of experience across four hospitals reads as more qualified than someone with three focused years at one facility. That assumption does not hold. The multi-facility candidate may have never reached genuine proficiency anywhere. Every move reset the clock. Every new facility ran a fresh orientation with no connection to what came before. When the next hospital sat across from them in an interview, the people asking questions came up through the same system and had no real framework to test beneath the surface presentation.
What you end up with is SPD leadership composed of people who stayed in the industry long enough, learned the right language, collected the right titles, and relocated whenever the questions got too specific. That is not a character failure. That is the rational response to a system that paid for time and never demanded proof.
SIPS Healthcare Solutions has implemented its operator system inside hospital SPDs with documented outcomes. In one hospital system, a single engagement produced a 27 percent reduction in FTE count without layoffs, a 96 percent elimination of OR delays attributed to SPD, a shift from being the number-one cause of surgical delays in the entire hospital to the last cause of delay across all departments, and a budget that moved from over to more than one million dollars under.
Same equipment. Same instruments. Same technology that was sitting in the building before we walked in. The only thing that changed was the operators and the system built to develop them.
One service line inside that same hospital saw a 100-percent increase in case volume over the course of the engagement. That did not happen because of a new surgeon or additional OR capacity. It happened because the OR started trusting what was coming up from SPD. Consistent trays. Accurate counts. No last-minute scrambles.
When that trust took hold, the schedule stopped needing buffer time built in as a hedge against SPD uncertainty. Open slots got filled. Cases that previously could not be scheduled were scheduled. Revenue that was not accessible before became accessible because the department underneath the OR finally became reliable.
These results did not happen because of what SIPS brought in alone. They happened because hospital leadership made a decision to commit to change and held that commitment the entire way through. Executive alignment was not a contributing factor in that turnaround. It was the condition that made the turnaround possible. In environments where leadership hedged, protected what was familiar, or pulled back when the process created friction, the pace and depth of change reflected that directly.
This work does not overcome resistant leadership. It multiplies committed leadership. Any perioperative leader considering this kind of investment should go in knowing that the results on the other side scale with the organizational will that exists on the front end.
When SPD performance breaks down, the conversation in most hospitals moves quickly to process gaps, headcount, or a new platform. Those conversations are not irrelevant. They are just addressing the wrong layer. By the time the OR is feeling the disruption, the problem has been building in the operator development layer for months, sometimes years.
The question that rarely gets asked is the one that matters most: How do we actually know who our operators are?
Not by job title. Not by years logged on a resume. Not by a certification card issued after a one-time exam. By demonstrated, verified, observable capability measured against a consistent standard and documented in a way that survives turnover, moves with the person from facility to facility, and cannot be satisfied by tenure alone.
Most SPD leaders cannot answer that question about the people working in their departments right now. The data does not exist in their buildings because operator development and verification has never been treated as a real infrastructure priority in this industry.
What got built was instrument tracking. Knowing where the tray is. When it was sterilized. Which cart it left on. That infrastructure works and it matters.
What never got built to that same standard is the parallel layer that tracks the humans handling those instruments. Verified competency at every stage. Demonstrated capability across every function they are authorized to perform. A development record that travels with them and cannot be faked by a title or satisfied by time.
Sterile By Design (SBD) is that system. It exists today. And it is worth being precise about what kind of system it is, because the distinction matters. The industry’s failure was not that it built systems. The failure was that it kept building systems on top of an operator layer that was never developed to support them. Instrument tracking placed over technicians who could not verify a complete tray. SOPs written for a workforce that never stayed long enough to own them.
SBD is not another layer placed on top of underdeveloped people. It is the infrastructure for developing the people themselves. That is a different category of investment entirely. The question is no longer whether that infrastructure exists. The question is how long your department operates without it.
Organizations that lead with systems and technology before the people underneath them are ready always overspend and underperform. That is not a healthcare observation. That is a pattern I have watched across industries for over a decade.
Sterile processing is just the version of it where the consequences land on a patient.
Jake Tayler Jacobs, DBA, MBA, B.Ed. is chief operating officer of SIPS Healthcare Solutions. A turnaround specialist with over a decade of experience building high-performing operator systems inside underperforming organizations, his current work focuses on the workforce development infrastructure of sterile processing departments across the United States. He can be reached at jjacobs@sipsconsults.com.